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NON-CHARITABLE PURPOSE TRUSTS:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Richard C. Ausness*
Editor's Synopsis: This Article focuses on non-charitable purpose
trusts and how they enable estate planners to better carry out their
clients' objectives. Specifically, it explores the history ofnon-charitable
purpose trusts and summarizes the differences between private trusts,
charitable trusts, and non-charitable purpose trusts. This Article also
examines the treatment of non-charitable purpose trusts in England
and the United States prior to the promulgation of the Restatement of
Trusts in 1935. This Article surveys the recent adoption of non-
charitable purpose trust provisions in the Uniform Trust Code and
various Restatements and gives advice on drafting the trust instru-
ments. Lastly, this Article concludes with suggested revisions to the
Uniform Trust Code.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Purpose trusts are trusts that are created to carry out a particular
purpose as opposed to distributing property to specified human bene-
ficiaries.' Charitable trusts are purpose trusts, even though they may
benefit certain individuals, because they are intended to promote some
broader public purpose such as the relief of poverty or the promotion of
education or religion.2 However, it is now possible to create private or
non-charitable purpose trusts as well.3 These trusts first appeared in
offshore jurisdictions such as the Isle of Man, Jersey, the British Virgin
Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, and Nevis.4
However, in recent years, these types of trusts have found increasing
acceptance in the United States, largely due to the incorporation of the
purpose trust concept in the Uniform Trust Code.5
1See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Purpose ofPurpose Trusts, 13 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 34, 34 (2004).
2 See id.
See id.
See id. at 35.
5 See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 408, 409 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 490-95 (2000).
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Examples include trusts for the maintenance of tombs, monuments
and gravesites, trusts for the performance of religious services,6 and
trusts for the care of animals,7 as well as trusts for "off-balance sheet"
financing and other business purposes. This relatively recent develop-
ment places additional tools in the hands of estate planners to enable
them to better carry out the useful objectives of their clients.9
In the past, courts tended to take a dim view of non-charitable pur-
pose trusts because the lack of human beneficiaries meant that there was
no mechanism to enforce them.'0 In addition, some of these trusts were
intended to be perpetual in nature and, therefore, violated the Rule
Against Perpetuities." The Uniform Trust Code addresses these concerns
and authorizes non-charitable purpose trusts for twenty-one years (or the
life of the animal if the purpose of the trust is to provide care for an
animal) as long as the trust's objectives are not wasteful or "capri-
cious."l2
This Article will trace the history of non-charitable purpose trusts
from their origins in nineteenth century England to the present day. Part I
will describe the differences between private trusts, charitable trusts, and
non-charitable purpose trusts. Part II will examine the treatment of non-
charitable purpose trusts in England and the United States prior to the
promulgation of the Restatement of Trusts in 1935. Part III will evaluate
the concept of the honorary trust as set forth in the various Restatements
as well as the Uniform Probate Code. Part IV will survey the provisions
of the Uniform Trust Code that relate to non-charitable purpose trusts
and identify various issues that need to be considered in the drafting of
these trusts such as identification of the trust's purpose, duration, and
enforcement. Finally, Part V will discuss the future of non-charitable
purpose trusts and suggest changes in the current state of the law.
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
7 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408, 7C U.L.A. 490-93.
See Bove, supra note 1, at 37.
See id. at 34.
10 See id
"See id
12 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409, 7C U.L.A. 493-95.
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II. NON-CHARITABLE AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS
A. Private Trusts
Express trusts may be categorized as either private trusts or chari-
table trusts.13 A private trust is typically created when a settlor transfers
property to a trustee for the use and enjoyment of one or more benefici-
aries.'4 Under traditional principles of trust law, private trusts must have
a settlor, one or more trustees,5 and one or more beneficiaries.16 In
addition, there must be a trust res, that is, property that is the subject of
the trust.'7
A settlor can also serve as a trustee, either as sole trustee or as a co-
trustee.'8 The trustee can be an individual or a corporate entity such as a
bank or trust company.'9 The trustee has legal title to the trust property,
while the beneficiaries have equitable title.20 In addition, the trustee
usually has possession of the property and manages it for the benefit of
the trust beneficiaries.21 Furthermore, the office of trustee is a fiduciary
one, which imposes a number of duties on the trustee.2 2 Finally, in many
states, the trust instrument can provide for the appointment of a trust
protector who may be given the power to supervise some of the trustee's
23actions.
13 See EDWARD E. CHASE, JR., LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TRUSTS § 1.4 (2d ed.
2015).
See Wendy S. Goffe, Oddball Trusts and the Lawyers Who Love Them or Trusts for
Politicians and Other Animals, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 543, 545 (2012). The settlor
may be one of these beneficiaries. See L.A. Sheridan, Power to Appoint for a Non-
Charitable Purpose: A Duologue or Endacott's Ghost, 13 DEPAULL. REV. 210, 211 (1964).
Whenever the term "trustee" is used, it may also include more than one trustee.
16 See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 1 (6th ed. 1987).
See Goughv. Satterlee, 52 N.Y.S. 492, 497 (App. Div. 1898).
18 See Yokemv. Hicks, 93 Ill. App. 667, 670 (1900).
See BOGERT, supra note 16, § 30.
20 See Lee-ford Tritt, Dispatches from the Trenches ofAmerica's Great Gun Trust
Wars, 108 Nw. U.L. REV. 743, 752 (2014).
21 See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IOWAL. REV. 641, 665 (1996).
22 These include, inter alia, the duty of loyalty and prudence, as well as the duty of
impartiality, the duty to earmark trust property, the duty to inform and account, the duty to
make the trust property productive, and the duty to not delegate. See Richard C. Ausness,
When Is a Trust Protector a Fiduciary?, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 277, 283 (2014).
23 See ALEXANDER A. BOVE, JR., TRUST PROTECTORS: A PRACTICE MANUAL WITH
FORMS 1 (2014); see Ausness, supra note 22.
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Trusts can be either inter vivos ("between the living") or testamentary,
if created by will. 24 An inter vivos trust is created by the settlor by means
of a written instrument known as a declaration of trust if the settlor intends
25to act as the trustee, or by a deed of trust if the property will be placed in
the hands of a third party trustee.26 "[A]n inter vivos trust may be revo-
cable or irrevocable."27 Revocable or "living" trusts are often viewed as
will substitutes since the settlor can revoke or modify the trust at any time
prior to death.28 Of course, once the settlor dies, this type of trust becomes
irrevocable because the settlor can no longer revoke or change it. Finally,
an inter vivos trust can also be irrevocable if the settlor does not reserve the
power to revoke or modify it. 29
The settlor can also create a trust by will. 30 This trust is known as a
testamentary trust and does not become effective until the settlor dies.31
A testamentary trust is inherently irrevocable since the deceased settlor
does not have the power to revoke it. However, a court may terminate or
modify a testamentary trust under the doctrine of equitable deviation.32 In
the alternative, the settlor may give a trustee or a trust protector the
power to terminate or modify a testamentary trust under certain circum-
stances.33
24
See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS,
TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 9.1 (4th ed. 2001).
25 See Falk v. Janes, 26 A. 138, 139 (N.J. 1893); In re Eshbach's Estate, 46 A. 905,
908 (Pa. 1900).
26 See New South Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Gann, 29 S.E. 15, 16 (Ga. 1897).
27 Tritt, supra note 20, at 753.
28 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(a) (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 546 (2000).
29 The common law rule was that a trust was presumed to be irrevocable unless the
settlor expressly retained the power to revoke. See Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 300, 302-
03 (1872). However, the Uniform Trust Code reverses this rule and provides that inter
vivos trusts are presumed to be revocable. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(a).
30 See Tritt, supra note 20, at 753.
31 See id
32 See Richard C. Ausness, Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead Hand:
The Modification and Termination of "Irrevocable" Trusts, 28 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J.
237, 257-62 (2015).
See id at 280-94.
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B. Charitable Trusts
Charitable trusts are established to achieve various charitable pur-
poses.34 In England, charitable uses were enforced by Chancery courts as
early as the fifteenth century.3 5 At the beginning of the seventeenth
century, the English Statute of Charitable Uses36 identified some twenty-
one charitable objectives.37 More recently, the Uniform Trust Code has
identified the following general categories: (1) the relief of poverty,
(2) the advancement of education or religion, (3) the promotion of health,
governmental, or municipal purposes, and (4) the promotion of other pur-
* 381poses that are beneficial to the community. In addition, charitable trusts
must benefit the public, or a significant segment of the public, and not be
illegal or contrary to public policy.39
Charitable entities may also be organized as foundations or nonprofit corpora-
tions, which are typically governed by a board of directors. See generally James J.
Fishman, The Development ofNonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34
EMORY L.J. 617 (1985).
3 5 
See GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827 (1969); Mary K.
Lundwall, Inconsistency and Uncertainty in the Charitable Purpose Doctrine, 41 WAYNE
L. REV. 1341, 1345-46 (1994); David Villar Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General,
and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A Historical Perspective on Charitable
Enforcement Reform, 11 FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 136 (2000).
36 See English Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, 43 Eliz. I, c.4 (Eng.).
See S.F.D., Jr., Note, The Enforcement of Charitable Trusts in America: A History
ofEvolving Social Attitudes, 54 VA. L. REV. 436, 439 (1968). In its preamble, the statute
declared:
[S]ome for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for
maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of
learning, free schools, and scholars in universities, some for repair of
bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways,
some for education and preferment of orphans, some for or towards
relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction, some for
marriages of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young
tradesmen, handicraftsmen . .. and others for relief or redemption of
prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any poor inhabitants
concerning payments of fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes
Mary K. Lundwall, Inconsistency and Uncertainty in the Charitable Purpose
Doctrine, 41 WAYNEL. REV. 1341, 1348-49 (1994).
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(a) (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 485 (2000); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
See Thrupp v. Collett, (1858) 53 Eng. Rep. 844, 845 (providing that a bequest to
pay fines for those imprisoned for poaching would undermine game laws).
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A charitable trust is administered by a trustee who owes the same
fiduciary duties as the trustee of a private trust.40 However, unlike private
trusts, charitable trusts have no specific individual beneficiaries; instead,
the equitable or beneficial interest in the trust is vested in the public at
large.4 ' Traditionally, the settlor of a charitable trust generally did not
have standing to enforce the trust unless he or she expressly retained that
power.4 2 Therefore, in the absence of identifiable beneficiaries,43 the state
attorney general or some other state official may enforce the trust under
44the state's parens patriae power.
In recognition of the benefit charitable trusts confer on the public,
they are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.45 However, since
charitable trusts may last indefinitely, they sometimes become obsolete.46
For this reason, courts can modify or invalidate "unlawful, impossible or
impracticable" restrictions under the doctrine of cy pres.
C. Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts
Non-charitable purpose trusts are private trusts that are intended to
achieve a particular non-charitable purpose instead ofbenefitting specific
individuals.49 Examples of purpose trusts include trusts for the construc-
tion and maintenance of graves and monuments, trusts for the saying of
masses, and trusts for the care of animals.o Purpose trusts can be traced
40 See Kelly McNabb, Note, What "Being a Watchdog" Really Means: Removing
the Attorney Generalfrom the Supervision of Charitable Trusts, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1795,
1798 n.14 (2012).
41 See Fishman, supra note 34, at 619 n.9.
42 See, e.g., Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App.
Div. 2001). But see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c), 7C U.L.A. 486 (2000).
In rare cases, a person who receives a benefit from the charity that is different
from that of the general public, such as a college professor who holds an endowed chair
provided by a charity, may enforce the trust against a delinquent trustee under the special
benefit rule. See McNabb, supra note 40, at 1808.
See id at 1800.
See id at 1798-99.
46 See id
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
48 See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts:
Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REv. 353, 369-72 (1999).
See Bove, supra note 1.
50 See James T. Brennan, Bequests for the Erection, Care, and Maintenance of
Graves, Monuments, and Mausoleums, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 35 (1969); see also Jennifer
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back to English trusts that were established to carry out these purposes,
,,51where they were described as trusts for "indifferent purposes.
Throughout much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts
refused to recognize the validity of many types of purpose trusts because
there was no human beneficiary to enforce them.52 In addition, courts
often held that purpose trusts violated the Rule Against Perpetuities if
they were either perpetual in nature or if their duration was measured by
something other than a human life. 5 3 Honorary trusts were eventually
recognized in some states due to their incorporation into the Restatement
of Trusts in 1935, which allowed, but did not require, a trustee to carry
out the provisions of the trust.4 Finally, in 2000, the Uniform Trust Code
introduced a more robust version of the purpose trust which resolved
both the enforceability and the perpetuities problems.
III. EARLY CASES
A. Doctrinal Issues
In the past, purpose trusts often ran afoul of two important legal
doctrines: the Rule Against Perpetuities and the beneficiary principle. In
its traditional form, the Rule Against Perpetuities, which is concerned
with the remote vesting of legal and equitable contingent interests,
requires that such interests be certain to either vest or fail to vest within a
period measured by lives in being plus twenty-one years.56 The bene-
ficiary principle, on the other hand, required that private express trusts
have ascertained or ascertainable human beneficiaries who are able to
R. Taylor, A 'Pet' Project for State Legislatures: The Movement Toward Enforceable Pet
Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 419, 420-21 (1999).
51 See Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 33, 34 (1999); see also Attorney-General v. Whorwood (1750), 27 Eng. Rep.
1188, 1189 ("The court has refused carrying into execution a particular turn of mind,
though it was not superstitious or illegal, but an indifferent use; as to feed sparrows, &c,
especially as this is for ever.") (counsel's argument).
5 2 See Tilden v. Green, 28 N.E. 880, 882 (N.Y. App. Div. 1891); Morice v. Bishop
of Durham (1804) 32 Eng. Rep. 656, 658 (Eng.).
53 See In re Howell's Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598, 604 (Sur. Ct. 1932); see also In re
Mills' Estate, 111 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625 (Sur. Ct. 1952).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 493-94 (2000).
56 See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50
UCLAL. REV. 1303, 1309 (2003).
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enforce the terms of the trust, if necessary, against a trustee who failed to
administer the trust properly.
1. The Rule Against Perpetuities
The traditional Rule Against Perpetuities requires that all contingent
future interests not fully vested either vest or fail to vest within the
lifetime of a living person plus an additional twenty-one years.5 " Contin-
gent interests that may potentially exceed this period are void ab initio.5 9
The use of "lives in being" as a measure of the validity of a contingent
interest was based on the assumption that a settlor could assess the capa-
bilities of living persons, but could know nothing about those who had
not yet been born.6 0 Although in recent years a large number of states
have modified the Rule Against Perpetuities or abolished it altogether,61
it can still present problems in those states where it has been retained in
its traditional form.62 This is particularly true in the case of trusts that are
expected to last for an indefinite period of time, such as trusts for the
perpetual saying of masses for the souls of the dead63 or trusts for the
perpetual care of graves, monuments, and tombstones.6 4 The Rule must
also be taken into account where trusts for the care of an animal are
concerned because animal lives cannot be used as measuring or
validating lives. 65 The Rule has also been invoked to invalidate trusts for
other uses that failed to qualify as charitable.66
See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem of
Doctrinal Change, 79 OR. L. REV. 527, 551 (2000).
58 See Goetz v. Old Nat'l Bank of Martinsburg, 84 S.E.2d 759, 772-73 (W. Va. 1954).
See Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor's Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV.
595, 600 (2005).
60 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 56, at 1309.
61 See Mary Louise Fellows, Why the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked
Perpetual Trusts, 27 CARDOZOL. REV. 2511, 2513 (2006).
62 See Bryant Smith, Honorary Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 60, 63 (1930).
63 See James T. Brennan, Bequests for Religious Services, 17 CLEV.-MARSHALL L.
REV. 388, 396-97 (1968).
64 See Brennan, supra note 51.
65 See Taylor, supra note 50.
66 See In re Hummeltenberg [1923] 1 Ch 237 at 242 (Eng.) (bequest for the training
of mediums); In re Nottage [1895] 2 Ch 649 at 653-54 (Eng.) (bequest for a silver cup to
encourage yacht-racing).
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2. The Beneficiary Principle
In the past, a trust was considered invalid if there were no ascer-
tained beneficiary available to carry out the settlor's intent if the trustee
failed to do so. 6 7 This was known as the "beneficiary principle,"68 which
invalidated a trust if the beneficiary class was too indefinite to identify or
when the purpose of the trust is not to benefit human beings. The reason-
ing behind the beneficiary principle was eloquently expressed by Justice
Roxburgh in In re Astor's Settlement Trusts:69
[H]aving regard to the historical origins of equity, it is
difficult to visualise the growth of equitable obligations
which nobody can enforce . .. [and] because it is not
possible to contemplate with equanimity the creation of
large funds devoted to non-charitable purposes which no
court and no department of State can control, or, in the
case of maladministration, reform.70
In the early days, courts regarded the lack of an ascertainable human
beneficiary as a fatal flaw even when the proposed trustee disclaimed
any beneficial interest in the trust and promised to administer the trust
faithfully. 7' This reasoning led many courts in the nineteenth century to
invalidate non-charitable trusts when there was no human beneficiary.72
B. The Certainty Principle
According to what might be called the "certainty principle," a valid
purpose trust must not only have certainty with respect to the objectives
of the trust, but also certainty that these objectives can actually be
attained.73 In other words, an otherwise valid trust will fail if it is not
capable of execution. An example of this problem is George Bernard
Shaw's will, which directed his trustees to determine how many persons
67 See J.B. Ames, The Failure of the "Tilden Trust," 5 HARV. L. REv. 389, 390
(1892).
68 See Hirsch, supra note 57, at 551-52.
69 [1952] 1 All E.R. 1067 (Eng.)
7 0 
Id. at 1071.
See, e.g, Morice v. Bishop of Durham, (1804) 32 Eng. Rep. 656, 656-57.
72 See id at 658; Tildenv. Green, 28 N.E. 880, 882 (N.Y. 1891).
See Bove, supra note 1, at 34-36. In contrast, if the purpose of a charitable trust
becomes impossible or impracticable to achieve, a court may save it by invoking the
doctrine of cy pres to devote it to a related charitable purpose. See Johnson, supra note
48, at 369-72.
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in the world spoke or wrote English "at any and every moment in the
world."" Although the court held in In re Shaw that the trust failed on
other grounds, it could also have invalidated the trust because this and
some of its other provisions were impossible to carry out.76 Some
American courts have also refused to enforce trusts that were not suffici-
77
ently funded to carry out their intended purposes.
C. Illustrative Cases
For the most part, early cases in England and the United States fell
into one of four categories: (1) bequests for the maintenance of tomb-
stones, graves, and monuments; (2) bequests for the performance of
masses for the dead and other religious services; (3) bequests for the care
of animals; and (4) bequests for other non-charitable purposes.
1. Tombstones, Graves, and Monuments
In the early days, both English7" and American7 9 courts treated trusts
for the maintenance of tombstones, graves, and monuments to the dead
See In re Shaw [1957] 1 All ER 745, 749 (Eng.).
See id at 758-59 (holding the trust to be non-charitable and, therefore, invalid
because it lacked an ascertainable beneficiary).
76 The underlying purpose of the trust was to promote the creation and introduction
of a new alphabet. In pursuance of this objective, Shaw directed his trustees to collect
information about the costs of retaining the existing alphabet, which he called Dr.
Johnson's alphabet, compared with the benefits of a reformed alphabet, which he called
the British alphabet. Among other things, Shaw directed his trustees to ascertain "the
number of extant persons who speak the English language and write it by the established
and official alphabet of twenty-six letters (hereinafter called Dr. Johnson's alphabet)." Id
at 749. Shaw also directed his trustees to "estimate the time and labour wasted by [the]
lack of at least fourteen unequivocal single symbols [in the existing alphabet]." Id In
addition, Shaw directed his trustees to determine "how much time could [have been]
saved per individual scribe by the substitution [of the British alphabet]." Id Finally,
Shaw ordered his trustees "to add where possible to the estimates of time lost or saved by
the difference between Dr. Johnson's alphabet and the proposed British alphabet
estimates of the loss of income in British and American currency." Id
See Renga v. Spadone, 159 A.2d 142, 145 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960).
78 See In re Rogerson [1901] 1 Ch 715 (Eng.) (trust to maintain tombs); Rickard v.
Robson (1862) 54 Eng. Rep. 1132 (trust to maintain tombs of settlor and his family);
Dawson v. Small [1874] 18 LR Eq. 114 (Eng.) (trust for the perpetual care of
tombstones); Hoare v. Osborne [1866] L.R. 1 Eq. 585 (Eng.) (trust to maintain, inter alia,
vault and monument of testator's mother).
79 See Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 22 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Ark. 1929) (bequest for
perpetual maintenance of gravesite); Alexander v. House, 54 A.2d 510, 512 (Conn.
1947); Hampton v. Dill, 188 N.E. 419, 422 (Ill. 1933) (bequest for perpetual care of
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as private trusts that were subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. For
example, in Meehan v. Hurley,o the testator bequeathed the sum of $500
in trust for the purchase of flowers to be placed on her grave each year
on Easter, Decoration Day, and Christmas."' Although the trustees con-
tended that the trust corpus would be exhausted within seven years, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court declared that since the flowers were to be
purchased for an indefinite length of time, the trust might well extend
beyond the period allowed by the Rule Against Perpetuities.82
Accordingly, the court ruled that the trust was void.83
However, the courts sometimes found ways to circumvent the Rule.
For example, several courts held that a provision to purchase specific
property for the purpose of erecting a monument for the interment of the
bodies of the settlor and his family was a funeral direction and not a trust
for perpetual maintenance of the monument.4 Another approach was to
characterize the trust as charitable and, therefore, not subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities at all. Finally, many states eventually dealt with
this by means of legislation.86
family burial lot); McCartney v. Jacobs, 123 N.E. 557, 558-59 (Ill. 1919) (bequest for the
perpetual care of relative's gravesite); Mason v. Bloomington Library Ass'n, 86 N.E.
1044, 1046 (Ill. 1908); Lounsbury v. Trs. of Square Lake Burial Ass'n, 129 N.W. 36, 37
(Mich. 1910) (trust for the perpetual care of gravesite); Hilliard v. Parker, 74 A. 447, 448
(N.J. Ch. 1909) (perpetual care of graveside lots); Hartson v. Elden, 26 A. 561 (N.J. Ch.
1893) (trust to build a monument to certain relatives); Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq.
347, 353-54 (1883) (trust for perpetual care of testator's tomb); In re Waldron, 109
N.Y.S. 681, 688 (Sur. Ct. 1907) (trust to maintain testator's grave in good repair);
Meehan v. Hurley, 150 A. 819, 820 (R.I. 1930) (trust to purchase flowers for settlor's
gravesite); Shipee v. Indus. Tr. Co., 110 A. 410, 411 (R.I. 1920); Kelly v. Nichols, 21 A.
906, 908 (R.I. 1891) (perpetual care of settlor's grave); Travis v. Randolph, 112 S.W.2d
835, 835 (Tenn. 1938) (perpetual upkeep of graves); McIlvain v. Hockaday, 81 S.W. 54,
55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) (perpetual care of testator gravesite).
80 150 A. 819 (R.I. 1930).
81 See id at 820.
82 See id
83 See id
84 See Mitford v. Reynolds (1848) 60 Eng. Rep. 812, 817-18; Leonard v. Haworth,
51 N.E. 7, 8 (Mass. 1898); In re Boardman, 20 N.Y.S. 60,61 (Sur. Ct. 1891).
85 See Stubblefield v. Peoples Bank of Bloomington, 94 N.E.2d 127, 134 (Ill. 1950);
Gallagher v. Venturini, 3 A.2d 157, 159 (N.J. Ch. 1938).
86 See Brennan, supra note 50. Some of these statutes expressly exempted these
bequests from the Rule Against Perpetuities. See id Other statutes permit individuals to
deposit money in trust to designated entities for cemetery purposes. See id. A third
category of statute authorizes individuals to deposit money with a designated public
official for the purpose of carrying out specified cemetery purposes. See id.
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Courts might also rely on the beneficiary principle to invalidate
trusts for the care of tombs or gravesites because there were no human
beneficiaries to enforce them. For example, in Whiting v. Bertram,"7 the
testator allocated funds to her executors to provide income "for the
decoration of the graves of my parents, sisters and brothers enumerated
in Item Three, and also my own grave on the following days of each and
every year: Easter, Decoration Day and Christmas Day.""" She also made
a similar provision for the decoration of her mother's grave on Mother's
Day.8 However, the court ruled that the trust was void, declaring "that a
private trust cannot exist without a cestui que trust."
90 Likewise, in In re
Koppikus' Estate,91 the testator allocated a sum of money to be used to
place flowers on her grave for a period of twenty-five years.92 Once
again, the court held this bequest to be invalid on grounds of indefinite-
ness because there was no human beneficiary to enforce it. 93
2. Masses for the Dead and Other Religious Services
The custom of underwriting the saying of masses and the per-
formance of other religious services can be traced back to medieval
England.94 However, during the Protestant Reformation, the performance
of Roman Catholic rituals, such as masses for the dead, were made
illegal by statute, and trusts for this purpose were subsequently condemn-
ed by the courts as "superstitious uses. "95 They were not determined to




90 Id. at 367-68.
91 81 P. 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 1905).
92 See id at 732.
See id at 733.
One of the feudal tenures at that time was "frankalmoign or free alms," under
which land was granted to a church or monastery in return for the prayers, other religious
services, or charitable acts for the benefit of the grantor and his heirs. See SHELDON F.
KURTZ, MOYNIHAN'S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 6 at 12 (6th ed.
(2015)). The passage of the first Mortmain Statute in 1279 prohibited subsequent convey-
ances of land in frankalmoign tenure by anyone other than the King, effectively putting
an end to new grants of frankalmoign tenure in England. See Mark A. Senn, English Life
and Law in the Time ofthe BlackDeath, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 507, 543 (2003).
95 See West v. Shuttleworth (1835) 39 Eng. Rep. 1106; Adams and Lambert's Case
(1598) 76 Eng. Rep. 1079; see also T. Bourchier-Chilcott, Superstitious Uses, 36 L. Q.
REv. 152, 154 (1920).
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be valid until 1919 when Bourne v. Keane96 was decided by the House of
Lords.97
In America, there was no legal impediment to the performance of
religious services, and courts usually upheld the validity of trusts for the
saying of masses for the dead.98 However, mortmain statutes posed a
potential problem in some cases.99 Thus, a New York court in In re
Beck's Estate'o held that a bequest of one half of the decedent's estate
for the perpetual care of his burial lot and one half for the saying of
masses violated the state's mortmain statute.0'
The Rule Against Perpetuities was another concern, although courts
developed a number of tactics to get around it. The most common
approach was to characterize these bequests as charitable trusts, thereby
exempting them from the Rule.102 Other courts have avoided the effect of
the Rule by construing the bequest as a present gift to the priest or to the
church 03 or as a funeral expense.04
Courts also invoked the beneficiary principle to invalidate trusts for
the saying of masses for the dead.0 5 For example, in Festorazzi v. St.
Joseph's Catholic Church,106 an Alabama court struck down a bequest
for the saying of masses for the testator's soul. 0 7 According to the court,
"[I]f the church should receive this bequest, and apply it to paying its
debts, repairing its building, supporting its priests, and paying the
96 [1919] A.C. 815 (Eng.).
See id
98 See Moran v. Moran, 73 N.W. 617, 622 (Iowa 1897); In re Gorey's Will, 170
N.Y.S. 635, 636 (Sur. Ct. 1919).
Mortmain statutes invalidated inter vivos gifts made to charities and religious
institutions if they were made within a certain time before death. See Shirley Norwood
Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the United States, 12 MIss. C.L. REv. 407, 411-28
(1992). These statutes also invalidated testamentary bequests if they exceeded a certain
share of the decedent's estate. See id Eventually, mortmain statutes ceased to be a
problem after most jurisdictions abolished them or held them unconstitutional. See id
100 225 N.Y.S. 187 (Sur. Ct. 1927).
101 See id
102 See, e.g, Estate of Hamilton, 186 P. 587 (Cal. 1919); Mahoney v. Nollman, 35
N.E.2d 265 (Mass. 1941); Kerrigan v. Tabb, 39 A. 701 (N.J. Ch. 1898); Matter of
Dobbins, 132 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1953); Matter of Semenza, 288 N.Y.S. 556 (Sur. Ct. 1936).
103 See Sedgewick v. Nat'l Say. & Tr. Co., 130 F.2d 440, 442 (4th Cir. 1942).
104 See In re Backe's Will, 30 N.Y.S. 394, 395 (Sur. Ct. 1894).
105 See, e.g, Holland v. Alcock, 16 N.E. 305, 307 (N.Y. 1888).
106 18 So. 394 (Ala. 1894).
107 See id at 396.
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expenses of their ceremonies, the purpose of the bequest would be clear-
ly violated. But what living person is authorized to call the trustee to an
account for the misuse of the fund?" 08 On the other hand, an Iowa court
in Wilmes v. Tiernay upheld such a trust against a claim that it violated
the beneficiary principle.109 According to the court, the trust qualified as
a "charitable or pious use.""10 Nor did it matter that the testator did not
identify any particular priest to perform these services, but left that
decision up to his executor.n1
3. Care ofAnimals
Trusts for the care of animals have generated a great deal of legal
scholarship.112 Unfortunately, they have also given rise to a considerable
amount of litigation.113 Because these trusts have no human beneficiary
and last for the life of the animal, they potentially violate both the bene-
ficiary principle and the Rule Against Perpetuities. This provides people
who do not like animals with credible bases for attacking animal care
trusts.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a few courts enforced
bequests for the care of pets and other animals."4 For example, in Willett
v. Willett," 5 a Kentucky court upheld a bequest for the care of a dog.116
18Id.
109 174 N.W. 271, 272-73 (Iowa 1919).
See id; see also Moranv. Moran, 73 N.W. 617, 622 (Iowa 1897).
See Wilmes, 174 N.W. at 273.
112 See, e.g., James T. Brennan, Bequests for the Care of Specific Animals, 6 DUQ.
U. L. REv. 15 (1967); Paige Dowdakin, Revisiting Roxy Russell: How Current Animal
Trust and Custody Laws Affect Elderly Pet "Guardians" in the Event of Death or
Incapacity, 20 ELDER L.J. 411 (2012); Goffe, supra note 14, at 543; Jennifer R. Taylor, A
"Pet" Project for State Legislatures: The Movement Toward Enforceable Pet Trusts in
the Twenty-First Century, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 419 (1999); Christin Cave,
Comment, Trusts: Monkeying Around with Our Pets' Futures: Why Oklahoma Should
Adopt a Pet-Trust Statute, 55 OKLA. L. REv. 627 (2002); Breahn Vokolek, Comment,
America Gets What It Wants: Pet Trusts and a Future for Its Companion Animals, 76
UMKC L. REv. 1109 (2008).
See, e.g., Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739 (Ky. 1923); In re Mills' Estate, 111
N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sur. Ct. 1952); In re Howell's Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598 (Sur. Ct. 1932); In
re Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
See, e.g., In re Dean, 41 ChD 552 [1889]; In re Estate of Kelly [1932] 1 IR (H.
Ct.); Willett, 247 S.W. 739; Wrenshall's Estate, 72 Pa. Super. 258, 259-62 (1919).
115 See Willett, 247 S.W. at 741.
116 See id
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In that case, the testator's will devised her entire estate to her sister,
Minnie Willett for life, except for $1,000 which was left to a trustee to be
used for the support of her dog, Dick." 7 At Minnie's death, the property,
both real and personal, was to be transferred to the Hopewell Church to
establish a charitable entity known as the Quincy Burgess Fund.""
Certain heirs of the testator maintained that the bequest to the Church
was "void for indefiniteness and uncertainty."ll9 They also argued that
the trust for the dog's support was invalid because no trustee was named
in the will and because the dog could not take as a devisee.120
Reversing the lower court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded
that the trust for Dick's support was allowable under a statute that
authorized devises and gifts for "charitable and humane purposes."'2'
While the court acknowledged that the provision for the support of a
specific animal did not qualify as charitable, it observed that "[c]harity
extends to every one of a class, while it is a humane purpose which
moves a person to take care of or feed a single hungry person, bird, or
dog." 22 It also ruled that the testator's failure to appoint a trustee would
not cause the trust to fail since the probate court has the power to appoint
one instead.123
However, other courts have been less sympathetic.124 For example, in
Howell's Estate,12 5 the testator executed a homemade will that expressly
disinherited her estranged husband and her nearest relative, a sister.126
Instead, she attempted to provide for her pets, two cats and three dogs, as
well as a friend, Charles Rattray, and the Teachers' Welfare Loan
Fund.12 7 The will declared that her residuary estate was to be held in trust
and authorized her executor to devote as much of the income as
necessary "for the care, comfort and maintenance of [her] pet
117 See id
118 i18See id
119 Id. at 739.




124 See, e.g, In re McNeill's Estate, 41 Cal. Rptr. 139 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); In
re Mills' Estate, 111 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sur. Ct. 1952); In re Howell's Estate, 260 N.Y.S.
598 (Sur. Ct. 1932), modifiedby 261 N.Y.S. 859 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
125 In re Howell, 260 N.Y. S. 598.
126 See id at 600.
127 See id at 601-02.
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animals."l28 The testator, who apparently held humans in less esteem
than dogs and cats, also authorized the trustee to expend any remaining
income "for the care, comfort and maintenance of Mr. Rattray."l29 Upon
the deaths of Rattray and the animals, the remaining trust corpus was to
be paid to the Teachers' Welfare Loan Fund.130
The New York Surrogate Court considered whether the trust com-
plied with section 11 of the Personal Property Law and section 42 of the
Real Property Law.131 Both of these statutes declared that absolute
ownership of property could not be postponed any longer than a period
measured by no more than two lives in being at the death of the
testator.132 This was essentially a codification of the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities but without the additional twenty-one years provided for in the
traditional Rule. 1 The court acknowledged that the testator's "dominant
testamentary desire was to provide for the care and welfare of her pet
animals who constituted her sole immediate family." 34 Nevertheless, it
reluctantly concluded that the duration of the trust for the care of her pets
was not measured by any human life, but solely by the lives of her
pets.13 5 Although the court recognized that courts in other countries had
upheld trusts for animals,136 it held that the trust in question did not
comply with the requirements of the New York statutes.137
128 Id. at 601.
129 Id. The trustee was also empowered to invade the corpus of the trust on behalf of
Rattray if the trust income was not sufficient for his support. See id.
130 See id at 602.
See id at 602.
132 See id at 602-03.
133 See id
134 Id. at 602.
135 See id at 604.
136 Id. at 605-06 (discussing In re Dean [1889] 41 Ch 552 (Eng.) and In re Estate of
Kelly [1932] 1 IR 255 (H. Ct.)).
See In re Howell's Estate, 260 N.Y.S. at 607. In addition, the court held that the
support trust for Charles Rattray was also invalid because the two bequests were "so
intermingled and interwoven that the invalidity in respect to the animals inevitably
involves a declaration that the entire trust is void." Id. Furthermore, the court concluded
that the remainder to the Teachers' Welfare Loan Fund was invalid because New York
law did not permit an unincorporated association to receive and hold personal property.
See id. at 608. Therefore, the court determined that the testator died intestate. See id. at
609.
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Some years later, another New York court invalidated a similar trust
because it failed to comply with these same statuteS.138 In Mills' Estate,
the decedent directed her executor to set aside a sum sufficient to pro-
duce income of $100 per year to provide for the care of any pets that she
might own at her death.139 After all of the pets died, the trust corpus was
to go to the New York Women's League for Animals.140 The Surrogate
Court concluded that the duration of this trust was measured solely by
the lives of the animals and, therefore, must fail since the phrases "lives
in being" and "persons in being" used in the statutes for purposes of
measurement referred to human lives.'4 ' However, the court held that the
remainder to the Women's League was a vested remainder with enjoy-
ment postponed that would become possessory immediately if the trust
was held invalid.14 2
Another example of a pet trust running afoul of the Rule Against
Perpetuities is In re Estate of McNeil.14 3 In that case, the testator left
legacies to Ms. Riser and Ms. Iverson.144 The former legatee was
entrusted with the care of the testator's two dogs, while the latter was
entrusted with the care of her cat. '4 The will further provided that the
residuary estate should be distributed separately to Reiser and Iverson in
trust.146 However, the income from the two trusts were to be treated as a
common fund from which $25 per week could be withdrawn to pay for
the support of each animal.14 7 Upon the death of the last animal, the
trusts would terminate and the corpus of each would be distributed to the
Los Angeles and San Francisco branches of the Society for the Pre-
vention of Cruelty to Animals.4 s Finally, the will provided that if any of
138 See In re Mills' Estate, 111 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sur. Ct. 1952).
139 See id at 624. The testator expressed a wish that the New York Women's
League care for her pets. See id.
140 See id
See id at 625.
142 See id. at 625-26. The court estimated that the bequest to the Women's League,
which was based on the size of the invalid trust, was $2,500, the amount that would
produce $100 per year at 4 percent interest. See id. at 626.
41 Cal. Rptr. 139 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).




148 See id The cat died prior to commencement of this litigation. See id
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the charitable bequests were held to be invalid, they would go instead to
the testator's friend, Margaret Looney.14 9
The trial court ruled that the trusts for the care of the animals were
invalid, but upheld the remainders to the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to animals over the objections of Ms. Looney.15 0 On appeal,
however, citing the Mills case, the appellate court affirmed the lower
court's decision, concluding that the remainder in question was vested
and, therefore, would be accelerated to a present interest when the trusts
were held invalid.15 1
On the other hand, in Renner 's Estate,152 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court skillfully avoided both the beneficiary problem and the perpetui-
ties issue.153 In that case, the testator bequeathed his residuary estate in
trust to his executor, Mary Riesing, for the care of his pets, a dog and a
parrot.'54 In addition, Mary was named as the remainder beneficiary, who
would take the trust property after the death of the animals.55 The
testator's niece and nephew challenged this provision, claiming that it
violated the Rule Against Perpetuities, and contended that the trust
corpus should go to them under the laws of intestate succession.15 6 The
lower court upheld the validity of the trust and the niece and nephew
appealed.'5 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the lower court's
conclusion that a trust had been created and instead held that the residu-
ary estate passed to Mary Riesing free of any trust.i1s
4. Other Non-Charitable Purposes
Bequests for non-charitable purposes have failed because they
violated the Rule Against PerpetuitieSl59 or the beneficiary principle.16 0
149See id at 140-41.
See id at 141.
150 See id at 141-42.
152 57 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1948).
See id at 838.





See id at 837-38.
See Goetz v. Old Nat'l Bank of Martinsburg, 84 S.E.2d 759, 773 (W. Va. 1954).
160 See In re Ralston's Estate, 37 P.2d 76 (Cal. 1934); Taylor v. Keep, 2 Ill. App.
368 (Ill. App. Ct. 1878); Tilden v. Green, 28 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y. 1891); Barton v. Parrott,
495 N.E.2d 973 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1984).
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Morristown Tr. Co. v. Mayor and Board ofAldermen of Town ofMorris-
town provides an interesting example of this failure.16 1 In that case, the
testator left funds to construct a bronze and granite flagstaff base in
Morristown Park.16 2 This monument was to bear an inscription that it was
donated to the City in memory of the testator's father.16 3 The court con-
cluded that the purpose of the trust was not charitable in nature and,
therefore, the trust violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.16 4
165A similar fate befell a public-spirited testator in the Nottage case.
Mr. Nottage, an enthusiast of yacht-racing, established a trust and direct-
ed that the income each year be used to purchase "a cup to be called 'The
Nottage Cup' which is to be given to the most successful yacht of the
season of over nineteen rating." 66 The winner of this award was to be
determined by the council of the Yacht Racing Association of Great
* 167Britain. According to the testator, the purpose of this award was to
"encourage the sport of yacht-racing. Unimpressed, the court con-
cluded that the trust was not charitable, and because it was intended to be
perpetual, the court also determined that it violated the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 169
However, bequests of this sort more often fail because they violate
the beneficiary principle. One group of cases involves bequests or trusts
for specific purposes, but with no identifiable person to enforce them.
Barton v. Parrott7 0is a good example of this. In Barton, the testator's
will directed her trustees to "establish, upon whatever terms and con-
ditions, and wherever they deem fit, an annual Harness Horse Stake
Race, named for, and in memory of, my daughter."'7' The Ohio Probate
Court concluded that the bequest was not charitable because a provision
for harness race did not benefit the general public.17 2 Furthermore, the
161 91 A. 736 (N.J. Ch. 1924).
162 See id at 736-37.
163 See id at 737.
164 See id
165 See In re Nottage [1895] 2 Ch 649 (Eng.).
166 Id. at 650.
167 See id
168 Id. at 654.
169 See id at 652-53.
170 495 N.E.2d 973 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1984).
171 Id. at 974.
172 See id at 975-76.
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bequest did not create a valid private trust because no identifiable human
beneficiary was identified.17 3
A related group of cases involves trusts where the trustee is given
complete discretion to determine to whom the property will be distri-
buted. In England, the leading case is Morice v. Bishop of Durham,17 4
decided in 1804. In that case, Ann Cracherode bequeathed £30,000 to the
Bishop of Durham "to dispose of the ultimate residue to such objects of
benevolence and liberality as the Bishop of Durham . .. [should] most
approve of." 75 After Ann died, her cousins challenged the validity of the
bequest.17 6 Sir William Grant, the Master of the Rolls, ruled that trust's
benevolent purposes were broader than those enumerated in the Statutes
of Charitable Uses.77 Consequently, the trust was deemed to be a private
one and not a charitable trust.17 The Bishop disclaimed any beneficial
interest in the trust corpus and agreed to dispose of the property in
accordance with the testator's wishes.17 9 Nevertheless, Sir William con-
cluded that for a private trust to be valid, "[t]here must be somebody, in
whose favour the Court can decree performance."'s The Court in this
case could not "assume a control; for an uncontrollable power of dispo-
sition would be ownership, and not trust."'s' Accordingly, he ruled that
the bequest failed and the property in question would instead revert to the
testatrix's cousins.182 This decision was affirmed by the Chancellor, Lord
Eldon,183 and subsequently followed by the English courts for many
years thereafter.s4
173 See id at 974.
(1804) 32 Eng. Rep. 656.
175 Id. at 656.
176 See id.
See id at 659.
178 See id
See id at 657.
180 Id. at 658.
181 Id.
182 See id at 659.
183 See Morice v. Bishop of Durham (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 947, 955.
184 See, e.g., Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson, [1944] AC 341 (Eng.) (bequest
for "benevolent" purposes); In re Endacott [1959] All ER 562 (Eng.) (bequest for
"benevolent purposes"); In re Astor's Settlement Tr. [1952] Ch. 534 (Eng.) (bequest for
"useful purposes"); In re Shaw [1957] 1 WLR 729 (Eng.) (bequest for developing a new
alphabet).
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This approach was also followed in the United States.s5 The leading
example of this is Tilden v. Green, decided in 1891 by the New York
Court of Appeals.18 6 In 1884, Samuel J. Tilden, former governor of New
York and the Democratic Party's candidate for president in 1876, execut-
ed a will.s7 The will created "special trusts" for Tilden's sister, nephews
and nieces from the residue of his estate and bequeathed the rest of the
residue to his executors in trust.s8 8 Another provision of the will directed
the executors to request the state legislature to create an institution
known as the Tilden Trust "with the capacity to establish and maintain a
free library and reading room in the city of New York, and to promote
such scientific and educational objects as ... [they] may more particular-
ly designate."8 9 Finally, the will also declared that if the Tilden Trust
was not incorporated or if for any reason the executors deemed it
inexpedient to transfer the residuary estate, or some portion of it, to the
Tilden Trust, they were authorized to apply it to such educational or
scientific purposes as in their judgment would be "most widely and
substantially beneficial to the interests of mankind." 90
Tilden died in 1886 and the legislature incorporated the Tilden Trust
the following year. However, some of Tilden's heirs brought suit to in-
validate the bequest o the Tilden Trust, claiming that it was void for lack
of an ascertainable beneficiary.191 The lower court held that the residuary
185 See, e.g, Read v. McLean, 200 So.2d 109, 110 (Ala. 1941); Adye v. Smith, 44
Conn. 60, 71 (1876); Moran v. Moran, 73 N.W. 617, 620-21 (Iowa 1897); Hoenig v.
Newmark, 306 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Ky. 1957); Grigson v. Harding, 144 A.2d 870, 876-77
(Me. 1958); Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 221 (1881); Chamberlain v. Stearns, 111
Mass. 267, 269 (1873); Corby v. Corby, 85 Mo. 371, 395 (1884); Hegeman's Ex'rs v.
Roome, 62 A. 392, 393 (N.J. Ch. 1905); Livesey v. Jones, 35 A. 1064, 1064 (N.J. Ch.
1896); Norris v. Thompson's Ex'rs, 19 N.J. Eq. 307, 313-14 (Ch. 1868); Holland v.
Alcock, 108 N.Y. 312, 317 (1888); In re Estate of Kradwell, 170 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Wis.
1969). But see Wilson v. Flowers, 277 A.2d 199, 207 (N.J. 1971) (interpreting
"philanthropic" to mean "charitable").
186 28 N.E. 880 (N.Y. 1891).
187 See id at 88 1.
188 See id
189 Id. To avoid violating the Rule Against Perpetuities, the executors were only
permitted to hold the property in trust for the lives of Tilden's niece, Ruby Tilden, and his
grandniece, Susie Whittlesey. See id In other words, the property would have to be
transferred to the Tilden Trust or some other charitable institution within Ruby and
Susie's joint lives or if the residuary bequest would lapse and be distributed to Tilden's
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bequest was invalid on this basis and an appeal was taken to the New
York Court of Appeals.19 2 The majority of that court agreed with the
lower court's reasoning and affirmed the judgment below.193 According
to the appeals court, Tilden made the executors donees of alternative
powers of appointment in trust.194 The executors could appoint the
property to the Tilden Trust once it came into existence or it could
appoint some or all of the property to some other, as yet undetermined,
charitable institution.19 5 The court concluded that the second power was
invalid because no ascertainable person or entity was identified as the
object of the power.196 Furthermore, the court refused to strike down the
second power while upholding the first one.9 7 Instead, it seemed to
regard both alternatives as an integral part of a single plan of dispo-
sition.198
Other courts also invalidated trusts for vague or indefinite pur-
poses.199 For example, in Ralston 's Estate,200 the testator left his entire
estate in trust and vested his trustee with "absolute authority to dispose of
this my entire estate as he may see fit." 201 However, the court held that
the testator's "failure to designate with sufficient certainty the objects or
,,202purposes of the trust makes the same invalid and unenforceable. In
another case, the testator declared:
I hereby authorize and empower my executrix to disburse
and give (in furtherance of my wishes expressed to her at
sundry times) from my estate, to such worthy persons and
objects as she may deem proper, such sums as it is her
pleasure thus to appropriate, not to exceed in all the total
sum of five thousand dollars.203
192 id
13See id at 889.
See id
See id at 882.
196 See id
197 See id at 887.
198 See id
'99 See, e.g, In re Sutro's Estate, 102 P. 920, 924 (Cal. 1909).
200 87 P.2d 76 (Cal. 1934).
201 Id. at 77.
202 Id. at 78.
203 Bristol v. Bristol, 5 A. 687, 690 (Conn. 1885).
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The court refused to give effect to this provision, declaring that the
will's language manifested no intent whatever as to the disposition of the
testator's property, but rather stood as a public declaration that he has no
such intent.204 Finally, the testator in Taylor v. Keep205 directed his
trustees to devote his residuary estate "to the founding or endowing here,
in the city of Chicago, upon a lasting basis, of such charitable or other
institution, as in their opinion (or in the opinion of a majority of them), is
most needed, and will do the most positive and enduring good, and the
least harm."206 Once again, the court concluded that the testator's bequest
to his trustees was void because of uncertainty.207
IV. HONORARY TRUSTS
In the twentieth century, courts developed an exception to the bene-
ficiary principle known as an "honorary" trust.208 These trusts were
called honorary because while the trustee could not be compelled to
carry out the purpose of the trust, he or she was honor bound to do so.209
Furthermore, alternative beneficiaries or intestate takers could sue to
terminate an honorary trust if the trustee refused to administer the trust or
subsequently failed to carry out its provisions.2 10 Although English courts
recognized honorary trusts in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, the concept did not find wide acceptance in the United States until
it was adopted by the First Restatement of Trusts.2 11
A. Early Cases
As early as 1848, the English Chancery Court implicitly recognized
the validity of a trust for the care of animals when it decided Mitford v.
204
See id at 691.
205 2 Ill. App. 368 (Ill. App. Ct. 1878).
206 Id. at 375.
207 See id at 384.
208 See Christina M. Eastman, Chapter 168: For the Love of Dog: California Fully
Endorses Trusts for PetAnimals, 40 McGEORGE L. REv. 543, 547 (2009).
209 See Ronald C. Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North
Carolina: The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and
Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1783, 1806 (1996).
210 See Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L.
REv. 2180, 2215 (2011).
211 See Gold v. Pice, 211 S.E.2d 803, 804 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); see also In re
Voorhis' Estate, 27 N.Y.S.2d 818, 821-22 (Sur. Ct. 1941); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TRUSTS § 124 (AM. LAW INST. 1935).
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Reynolds.2 1 2 In the eighth clause of his will, the testator provided for the
construction of a suitable, handsome, and durable monument on certain
property that he did not currently own.2 13 The ninth clause bequeathed
his residuary estate to the government of Bengal, India, then a British
colony, to be used for charitable, beneficial, and public works for the
benefit of the inhabitants of that region.2 14 However, the testator also
directed that a portion of his residuary estate be set aside to care for his
horses.2 15 The Vice-Chancellor concluded that the eighth clause must fail
because the owner of the land where the proposed monument was to be
constructed was unwilling to sell it. 2 16 However, the court also deter-
mined that the bequest to the government of Bengal was not affected by
the invalidity of the eighth clause and upheld it as a charitable bequest.217
Significantly, the Vice-Chancellor's decree directed that provision be
made for the maintenance of the testator's horses, in effect, affirming the
validity of the trust that the testator created for their care.218
Forty years later, in In re Dean, an English court relied on the
Mitford decision to uphold the validity of a trust for the care of the
testator's horses and hounds.219 In his will, William Dean authorized the
payment of f750 to his trustees for a period of up to fifty years for the
care and maintenance of his horses, ponies, and hounds.2 20 The court
acknowledged that the bequest was not charitable in nature and that there
was no human beneficiary who could enforce it. 2 21 Nevertheless, the
court observed, a person could bequeath property to trustees for the con-
struction of a graveside monument even though there was no beneficiary
to enforce it against the trustee.22 2 In addition, the court pointed out that
since a charity could be established for the benefit of horses or dogs in
general, there was no reason to conclude that a similar provision for
212 (1848) 60 Eng. Rep. 812.
213 See id at 813.
214 See id at 813-14.
215 See id. at 813. The testator further declared that the lucky horses were to be
"preserved as pensioners, and are never under any plea or pretence, to be used, rode or
driven, or applied to labour ..... Id.
216 See id at 816-17.
217 See id at 816.
218 See id at 818.
219 [1889] 41 Ch 552 (Eng.).
220 See id at 553.
221 See id at 556.
222 See id at 556-57.
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particular horses or dogs was "illegal or obnoxious to the law."223
Furthermore, the court declared that a trust of this nature had been
previously approved by the Chancery Court in Mitford v. Reynolds and
relied upon that decision to uphold the validity of the trust in this case as
well.224
The Irish High Court of Justice subsequently reached a similar result
in In re Estate of Kelly.2 25 In that case, a Kilkenny County farmer left
£100 in trust with directions to spend f4 a year for the support of each of
his dogs.226 The testator further specified that if the dogs died before the
full amount was expended, the remaining money was to be given to the
parish priest of the parish of Tullaroan to say masses for the repose of his
soul and the souls of his parents, brothers, and stepfather.227 Several of
Dean's cousins, the residuary legatees, challenged the validity of these
bequests.228 Addressing the validity of the gift to the parish priest, the
court expressed concern that the remainder would not vest until the dogs
died.229 It declared that one could not measure the perpetuities period by
reference to the dogs' lives, nor could one assume that the dogs would all
die within twenty-one years, observing that "[i]n point of fact neigh-
bour's dogs and cats are unpleasantly long-lived."23 0 Therefore, it
concluded that the gift to the parish priest was void.231
As far as the care of the testator's dogs was concerned, the court
relied on In re Dean to conclude that the trust was not void for lack of a
human beneficiary as long as the trustees were ready and willing to carry
out the terms of the trust.232 Therefore, the only remaining issue was
whether the trust violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.23 3 The court
resolved this problem by viewing the trust as authorizing a series of
234annual expenditures over a maximum period of twenty-one years.
223 See id at 557.
224 See id
225 [1932] 1 IR 255 (H. Ct.).
226 See id at 260.
227 See id
228 See id at 256, 260.
229 See id at 260.
230 Id. at 260-61.
231 See id at 261.
232 See id.
233 See id
234 See id at 262.
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Furthermore, it determined that since the testator had four dogs, the
trustees would have to expend £16 a year for their support, an expendi-
235ture that would exhaust the entire trust corpus within a few years.
However, the court concluded that any expenditures beyond the twenty-
one year period would be void and the dogs would then have to take their
chances.23 6
Although the courts have generally upheld honorary trusts for such
benevolent purposes as the maintenance of gravesites, saying of masses,
and care of animals, they have not hesitated to invalidate trusts for
wasteful or "capricious" purposes.237 Thus, in McCaig v. University of
Glasgow,2 38 McCaig directed that all of his estate be devoted to building
statues of himself, along with towers in conspicuous places on his
property.239 The court took a dim view of the testator's plans:
I suppose it would be hardly contended ... if the
purposes ... were to be slightly varied and the trustees
were, for instance, directed to lay the truster's estate
waste, and throw the money yearly into the sea; or to
expend income in annual or monthly services in the
testator's memory, [n]o such purpose would be con-
sistent with public policy.24 0
Another court was equally unsympathetic to a similar project in
Aitken 's Trustees v. Aitken.241 In that case, the testator bequeathed a
substantial sum of money to construct a massive equestrian bronze statue
representing him as the Champion at the Riding of the Towns
Marches.24 2 The court held that the bequest was void, contending that it
was for an "irrational, futile, and self-destructive scheme"24 3 and because
235 See id
236 See id at 263.
237 See In re Hummeltenberg [1923] 1 Ch 237 (Eng.) (bequest for the training of
mediums); Aitken's Trustees v. Aitken, 1927 Sess. Cas. 374 (bequest to erect an
extravagant equestrian statue of the testator); Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq. 347, 350
(Ch. 1883) (bequest o pay for marching band to play at testator's gravesite).
238 (1907) S.C. 231 (Scot.).
239 See id
240 Id.
241 [1927] SC 374 (Scot.).
242 See id
243 Id. at 383.
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"[t]he statute's erection would cause the memory of the testator to stink
in the nostrils of the community of Mussleburgh ..... 244
Finally, Brown v. Burdett2 45 provides yet another example of a
capricious purpose. In that case, the testator directed the trustee to brick
246up the windows and doors of her house for a period of twenty years.
The court refused to enforce the trust because of its capricious and
wasteful character.247
B. The Restatement of Trusts
Professor James Barr Ames introduced the concept of the honorary
trust in his celebrated article on the Tilden case.248 The idea was later
taken up by Professor Austin Wakeman Scott, the Reporter for the
Restatement of Trusts.249 Section 124 of the First Restatement of Trusts,
promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1935, declared:
Where the owner of property transfers it upon an
intended trust for a specific non-charitable purpose, and
there is no definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary
designated, no trust is created; but the transferee has
power to apply the property to the designated purpose,
unless he is authorized by the terms of the intended trust
so to apply the property beyond the period of the rule
against perpetuities, or the purpose is capnicious.250
Many of the issues raised by this provision were fleshed out in the
accompanying comments. First, the transferee cannot be compelled to
apply the property to the designated purpose.251 Second, the transferee
may apply the property to the designated purpose (subject to certain
exceptions discussed below), but if he or she refuses to do so, the
252transferee will hold it upon a resulting trust for the settlor or his estate.
Third, although this arrangement is called an honorary trust, it is not
244 Id. at 382.
245 [1882] 21 Ch 667 (Eng.).
246 See id at 668.
247 See id at 673.
248 See Ames, supra note 68, at 396-98.
249 See Hirsch, supra note 51, at 397.
250 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 (AM. LAW INST. 1935).
251 See id § 124 cmt. a.
252 See id § 124 cmt. b.
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really a trust since there is no beneficiary who can enforce the settlor's
directive; instead, it is a power of appointment rather than a trust.253
Fourth, the provisions of section 124 are applicable to (1) the erection
and maintenance of tombstones and monuments to the dead, (2) the care
of graves, (3) the saying of masses and the performance of other
religious rituals, and (4) the care of animals.2 54 Fifth, honorary trusts are
subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Therefore, in the absence of a
validating life, the trust cannot last for more than twenty-one years.255
Finally, the purpose for which the honorary trust is established cannot be
* * 256capricious.
Both the black letter text and the comments to section 124 of the
Second Restatement of Trusts, promulgated in 1959, were similar to
those of the First Restatement.2 57 Section 47 of the Third Restatement of
Trusts, promulgated in 2003, also retained much of the structure of the
earlier Restatements, but classified honorary trusts as a form of adapted
trust.258 Section 47 declared:
(1) If the owner of property transfers it in trust for indefinite or
general purposes, not limited to charitable purposes, the trans-
feree holds the property as trustee with the power but not the
duty to distribute or apply the property for such purposes; if and
to whatever extent the power (presumptively personal) is not
exercised, the trustee holds the property for distribution to
reversionary beneficiaries implied by law.
253 See id § 124 cmt. c.
254 See id § 124 cmt. d.
255 See id § 124 cmt. f.
256 See id § 124 cmt. g.
257 See Hirsch, supra note 51, at 44 n.42. This may be because Austin Wakeman
Scott served as Reporter for both Restatements. See id However, Professor Hirsch points
out that the First Restatement of Trusts only applied the concept of the honorary trust to
definite non-charitable purposes, while the Second Restatement extended it to indefinite
purposes as well. See id. at 45 n.50 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 123
(AM. LAW INST. 1959)).
258 See Edward C. Hallbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in
American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1877, 1897 (2000). Under
sections 46 and 47, provisions that cannot be enforced under ordinary trust principles
may be allowed as "adapted trusts." See id. Under this approach, the settlor's intended
purpose may be carried out, within reasonable time limits if the devisee or legatee will do
so by exercising a non-mandatory, generally personal "power" to appoint or expend trust
funds for the members of an indefinite class or the non-charitable purpose. See id
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(2) If the owner of property transfers it in trust for a specific non-
charitable purpose and no definite or ascertainable beneficiary is
designated, unless the purpose is capricious, the transferee holds
the property as trustee with power, exercisable for a specified or
reasonable period of time normally not to exceed 21 years, to
apply the property to the designated purpose; to whatever extent
the power is not exercised (although this power is not presump-
tively personal), or the property exceeds what reasonably may be
needed for the purpose, the trustee holds the property, or the
excess, for distribution to reversionary beneficiaries implied by
law. 25 9
Like the earlier Restatements, section 47 referred to the transferee as
a "trustee," but conceptualized the transferee's status as that of a donee
of a power of appointment rather than that of a traditional trustee.260
Furthermore, section 47 did not limit itself to transfers in trust for
specific non-charitable purposes, but also applies to transfers in trust for
more indefinite or general purposes.261 In this latter case, where the
transferee was authorized to distribute the property for such "worthy,"
"charitable," or "benevolent" purposes as he may select, section 47(2)
allowed him to do so within a reasonable time or else the property would
revert to the settlor's successors in interest.2 6 2 This provision also
assumed that the transferee's power of appointment is personal.263 There
fore, the power would lapse if the transferee died before exercising the
264power.
According to the Third Restatement, when property is transferred to
a person in trust for a specific non-charitable purpose, the transferee
could apply the property to the designated purpose as long as it was not
capricious.2 65 According to comment d, "the devisee holds the property
in trust adapted by operation of law, for the successors in interest of the
testator, subject to the devisee's non-mandatory power to carry out the
testator's intended purpose."266 Comment c pointed out that, except in the
259 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
260 See id § 47 cmt. a.
261 See id
262 See id § 47 cmt. c.
263 See id
264 See id § 47(1).
265 See id § 47 cmt. d.
266 Id.
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case of trusts involving the care of pets or graves, these trusts were
267normally limited to a maximum period of 21 years. According to
comment g, an honorary trust was considered to be revocable if it was
created by an inter vivos transfer of property.2 68 Finally, although the
Restatement described the transferee's disposition of property as the
exercise of a power of appointment,2 69 it also declared that the transferee
owed a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries,270 that is, the settlor's suc-
cessors in interest, to protect and manage the property and was subject o
removal for breach of these fiduciary duties.271
C. The Uniform Probate Code
In 1990, the Uniform Probate Code was amended to allow for the
creation of honorary trusts.272 Section 2-907(a) provided that:
[I]f (i) a trust is for a specific lawful non-charitable
purpose or for lawful non-charitable purposes to be
selected by the trustee and (ii) there is no definite or
definitely ascertainable beneficiary designated, the trust
may be performed by the trustee for [21] years but no
longer, whether or not the terms of the trust contemplate
273
a longer duration.
Section 2-907(b), which was revised in 1993 to eliminate problems
with the Rule Against Perpetuities,274 authorized trusts for the care of
domestic animals or pets.2 75 This subsection provided that:
[A] trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet
animal is valid. The trust terminates when no living
animal is covered by the trust. A governing instrument
must be liberally construed to bring the transfer within
this subsection, to presume against the merely precatory
267 See id § 47 cmt. c.
268 See id § 47 cmt. g.
269 See id § 47 gen. cmt. a and cmts. b-d at 232.
270 See id § 47 cmt. d.
271 See id
272 See Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly in the
Uniform Laws, 26 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 913, 914-15 (1999).
273 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (amended 1993), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 355 (2013).
274 See Cave, supra note 112, at 645.
275 See id
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or honorary nature of the disposition, and to carry out
the general intent of the transferor. Extrinsic evidence is
admissible in determining the transferor's intent.27 6
It can be seen that the Uniform Probate Code distinguished between
a traditional honorary trust and a trust for the care of an animal by
subjecting the first to a durational limit while allowing the second to last
for the life of the animal "beneficiaries."277
Finally, section 2-907(c) contained a number of provisions that were
applicable to both types of trusts.278 For example, subsection 2 described
how any remaining property will be distributed when the trust termi-
nated;2 79 subsection 4 declared that the trust provisions could be enforced
by an individual designated for that purpose in the trust instrument or by
an individual appointed for that purpose by a court;280 subsection 5
provided that the trustee was normally not required to provide periodic
accountings, segregate trust funds, or perform other fiduciary duties that
are normally required of a trustee;281 and subsection 6 stated that a court
could reduce the amount of property transferred to the trust if it deter-
mined that it substantially exceeded the amount necessary to carry out
the settlor's intended use.282 Finally, according to subsection 7, if no
trustee was named or if the designated trustee was unwilling or unable to
serve, a court was authorized to order that the property be transferred to
another person who was willing to serve as trustee.28 3 This last provision,
of course, was a significant departure from the traditional honorary
trust.28 4
D. Illustrative Cases
1. Tombstones, Graves, and Monuments
There are a number of reported decisions that have treated bequests
for the erection and maintenance of monuments or the care of gravesites
276 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 356.
277 See Cave, supra note 113, at 645.
278 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 356.
279 See id § 2-907(c)(2)(A)-(C).
280 See id § 2-907(c)(4).
281 See id § 2-907(c)(5).
282 See id § 2-907(c)(6).
283 See id at § 907(c)(7).
284 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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as honorary trusts.285 In re Devereux 's Estate286 IS illustrative of this
approach.287 In that case, the testator left $4,000 in trust to his executors
for the care and preservation of certain cemetery lots and monuments in
the South Laurel Hill Cemetery.288 His will contained no residuary
clause.289 Yearly payments were made to the cemetery company for this
purpose over the years and by 1939, the accumulated surplus income
from the trust amounted to almost $11,000.290 The auditing judge ruled
that the unexpended income in the trusts was excessive and awarded
most of it to several individuals who claimed to be the next of kin to the
testator, John, and the testator's sister, Annie.291 In response, the ceme-
tery company claimed the surplus to use for general maintenance of the
cemetery grounds.292
The court observed that many commentators classified such legacies
,,293as "honorary trusts. However, it rejected the Restatement's power of
appointment approach29 4 and instead characterized the t stator's arrange-
ment as a trust:
It is perfectly clear, therefore, that in Pennsylvania
this type of bequest is regarded as a trust, possessing all of
the essential incidents thereof, that the trustee becomes
vested with a legal estate-not merely a power with a
duty of applying it to the purpose of the trust; that the lack
of a cestui que trust, which normally results in there being
no one having standing to compel the trustee to perform,
is here supplied by the power and implementation of the
orphans' court to supervise and control the activities of
285 See Renga v. Spadone, 159 A.2d 142, 145 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1960); Gold v. Price,
211 S.E.2d 803, 804 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); In re Braig's Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 2d 469,
473 (Orphans' Ct. 1965); In re Hetrick Estate, 71 York 57, 78-79 (Pa. Orphans' Ct.
1957); In re Devereux's Estate, 48 Pa. D. & C. 491, 498 (Orphans' Ct. 1943).
286 48 Pa. D. & C. 491.
287 See id
288 See id at 492.
289 See id at 494.
2 9 0 See id at 493.
291 See id at 494.
292 See id
293 See id at 498.
294 See id at 499.
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the trustee, suo moto, or upon application of or on the
failure of the testator's next of kin.295
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the decision to award most of the
surplus interest to the next of kin since it was not necessary to carry out
the purposes of the trust.2 96 According to the court, the bequest to the
trust was not absolute;2 97 rather, the testator's heirs retained something
analogous to a possibility of reverter,2 98 which would become possessory
once the surpluses were judicially declared to exist.29 9 Alternatively, the
court declared that the surplus would pass to the testator's next of kin by
way of a resulting trust.300
In In re Byrne 's Estate,301 although the court found that a trust for the
construction and maintenance of a monument for the deceased testator
was not charitable, it concluded that it might qualify as an honorary trust
if the trustee proved willing to carry out its provisions.30 2 Unfortunately,
the cemetery officials refused to allow the monument in question to be
constructed, so the trust failed because it was impossible to achieve its
intended purpose.303 A New Jersey court reached a similar result in
Renga v. Spadone304when it found that there was not enough money in
the trust to construct the sort of mausoleum the testator had
- - 305envisioned.
295 Id. at 500. The auditing judge allowed the trustees to retain $500 as a reserve for
unforeseen future expenses. See id. at 494.
296 See id at 494.
297 See id at 500.
298 See id. at 501. Arguably, the interest was an executory interest rather than a
possibility of reverter since it was vested in the testator's heirs at the same time a
possessory interest was transferred to the executors.
299 See id
300 See id. (citing the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 430 & cmt. g (AM. LAW INST.
1935)).
301 100 A.2d 157 (N.H. 1953).
302 See id at 159-60.
303 See id at 160.
304 159 A.2d 142 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960).
305 See id at 145.
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2. Masses for the Dead and Other Religious Services
Only a few cases have discussed the application of the honorary trust
concept in connection with the saying of masses.306 In one case, the court
held that a bequest of $100 to the parish priest of St. Patrick's Church in
Valley Falls, Rhode Island "to say masses for me" was a valid gift to the
priest and not a trust.307 In another case, the testator left his residuary
estate to the Franciscan Fathers, Christ the King Seminary, St. Bonaven-
ture University in Olean, New York, "with the request hat High Masses
be said for the repose of my Soul and the repose of the soul of my said
wife." 3 08 The case was mainly concerned with identifying the intended
beneficiary since there were two Franciscan friaries operating on the
campus of St. Bonaventure University at the time the will was exe-
cuted.30 9 However, the court also observed in passing that the bequest did
not create an honorary trust for the purpose of celebrating masses, but
instead concluded that the words were merely precatory in nature and did
310
not impose a trust on the beneficiaries.
3. The Care ofAnimals
A common form of honorary trust is one for the care of animals.3 11
Not surprisingly, these types of trusts have given rise to a considerable
amount of litigation.3 12 Without doubt, the leading American case involv-
ing honorary trusts for animals is In re Searight's Estate.313 In his will,
George Searight bequeathed his dog, Trixie, to Florence Hand and di-
rected his executor to deposit $1,000 in a local bank for the purpose of
paying Florence 75 cents per day to take care of Trixie. 3 14 At the dog's
306 See Estate of Beckley, 405 N.Y.S.2d 861 (App. Div. 1978); Sherman v. Baker,
20 R.I. 446 (1898).
307 Sherman, 20 R.I. 446.
308 Estate ofBeckley, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
309 See id. at 863. The court concluded that the testator intended both friaries to
share in the bequest.
310 See id at 864.
311 See Bove, supra note 1, at 34-35.
312 See, e.g, Phillips v. Estate of Holzmann, 740 So.2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
In re Renner's Estate, 57 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1948); In re Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779
(Ohio Ct. App. 1950); Richberg v. Robbins, 228 S.W.2d 1019 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950); In
re Stewart's Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 488 (Orphan's Ct. 1979); In re Lyon's Estate, 67
Pa. D. & C.2d 474 (C. P. 1974); Matter of Fouts, 677 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sur. Ct. 1998).
313 95 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
3 14 See id at 780.
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death, any remaining funds were to be paid to five specified individuals,
including Florence.3 15 Florence accepted the bequest and agreed to take
care of the dog in accordance with Searight's wishes.316
However, a dispute arose over whether Florence and the remainder
beneficiaries were required to pay an inheritance tax on the value of
Trixie and the trust.317 The parties agreed that the question of liability for
the tax depended on whether the trust was valid or whether the trust
corpus should be distributed immediately to the five remainder benefici-
aries.318 After reviewing the writings of various legal commentators on
the nature of honorary trusts, the court declared that "[t]he object and
purpose sought o be accomplished by the testator in the instant case is
not capricious or illegal. He sought to effect a worthy purpose-the care
of his pet dog., 319 Accordingly, the court held that such a trust was valid,
notwithstanding the lack of a human beneficiary.320
The court then considered whether the trust violated the Rule
Against Perpetuities since its duration was measured by the life of the
dog.3 21 Taking its cue from the Irish High Court's decision in In re
Kelly,3 22 the court in Searight calculated that $1,000, when deposited in a
bank at six percent interest, would be exhausted in less than four years if
75 cents per day were distributed to Florence for the care of the dog.323
Therefore, the court determined that because it was mathematically im-
possible for the trust to last more than twenty-one years, it did not violate
the Rule Against Perpetuities.32 4
Other cases have raised interesting issues in connection with trusts
for the care of animals. For example, what happens to the trust corpus
when the proposed trustee refuses to accept the position or when the
animal in question dies? In Phillips v. Estate ofHolzmann,325 the testator
315 See id
3165i36See id
3 17 Seeid at 780-81.
3 18 See id at 781.
319 Id. at 782.
320 See id
321 See id at 783.
322 [1932] 1 IR 225 (H. Ct.).
323 See Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 783.
324 See id Of course, the trust would have lasted much longer, perhaps even
indefinitely, if the rate of return was substantially greater than the six percent assumed by
the court.
325 740 So.2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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bequeathed $25,000 to her "beloved friend," Jo Ellen Phillips, to care for
her two dogs, Riley and Shaun.326 Unfortunately, shortly after the
testator's death, her dogs had to be euthanized for health reasons.327 As a
result, the testator's parents sought to have the trust corpus returned to
her estate.328 The trial court ruled that the bequest to Jo Ellen created an
honorary trust, which failed when the dogs died.329 Terefore, the trust
became a resulting trust for the benefit of Holzman's residuary lega-
tees.330 In affirming the trial court's decision, the appeals court concluded
that the testator intended to create an honorary trust for the care of her
dogs and because the transferee could not use the money for its intended
purpose, it must be returned to the testator's estate.331
Courts have also sometimes been called upon to decide whether a
bequest for the care of an animal is excessive for that purpose. For
example, in Stewart Estate,332 the testator left the residue of her estate,
approximately $76,000, in trust to her executor for the care of her three
cats, Preserved, Marmalade, and Relish.333 At the death of the last cat,
the remainder of the trust corpus was to go to Wellesley College.334 The
court ruled that the bequest could not be given effect as an ordinary
private trust because there was no human beneficiary to enforce it.33 5
However, it approved a plan to withhold $5,000 to pay one of the
legatees, Grace Gonzales, $75 per month to take care of the cats while
the rest of the money went to Wellesley College.336
A similar issue arose in Lyon 's Estate.337 In that case, Florence
Lyon's will, after disposing of about $250,000 to various legatees,
provided that the remainder of her $1.4 million estate, would be placed in
trust for the care of four horses and six dogs living on the testator's dairy





331 See id at 3.
332
13 Pa. D. & C. 3d 488 (Orphan's Ct.1979).
See id at 489.
See id
335 See id.
336 See id at 490.
67 Pa. D. & C.2d 474 (C. P. 1974).
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farm.338 After the death of the animals, the trust corpus was to go to
Princeton University.33 9 The court stated that the income from the trust
would produce $40,000 to $50,000 per year.34 0 Relying on section 124 of
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the court upheld the bequest as an
honorary trust, observing that the trustees had agreed to care for the
animals.3 41 At the same time, it concluded that amount provided for the
care of the animals was "patently unsupportable" and proposed a number
of options the parties and the Orphans' Court to consider that would
allocate a reasonable amount of money for the animals' support.342
4. Other Non-Charitable Purposes
The English courts have generally refused to approve of trusts for
benevolent purposes that do not qualify as charitable in nature.343
Perhaps, the most famous of these cases was the Alphabet Trusts of
George Bernard Shaw.344 In his will, Shaw made a bequest for the
purpose of developing an alphabet of forty letters.3 45 Although the
Chancery Court invalidated the will for lack of a beneficiary, the parties
eventually reached a settlement by which funds were allocated to pro-
duce the alphabet that Shaw desired and his play Androcles and the Lion
was published using it.3 46
There have been a few cases in the United States upholding honorary
trusts for other non-charitable benevolent purposes.34 7 For example, in
Feinberg v. Feinberg,348 the testator provided that the balance of her
338 See id at 477.
See id
340 See id
341 See id at 478-79.
342 See id at 483-84.
See, e.g., In re Bushnell [1975] 1 WLR 1596 at 1605 (Eng.) (promoting
socialized medicine through forced curriculum ruled not charitable in nature). But see In
re Thompson [1934] Ch 342 at 344 (Eng.) (approving the legality of a trust even through
the promotion of fox-hunting was deemed a non-charitable cause).
See In re Shaw, [1957] 1 All E.R. 745, 749-50 (Ch.).
345 See id at 749.
346 See Hirsch, supra note 51, at 63.
See, e.g., Cochran v. McLaughlin, 24 A.2d 836, 839 (Conn. 1942) (upholding a
trust which directed funds to be disbursed for "charitable, benevolent, religious, or
education purposes.").
348 131 A.2d 658 (Del. Ch. 1957).
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estate was to be used to pay $100 or more to six charities.349 However,
another provision declared that
[t]he above directions for the expenditure of my trust
estate are not intended to bind my trustee either as to the
amount to be given or the institution or individual to
receive the same, but having full faith and confidence in
my said executor and trustee, I know that he will apply
this money where it will do the most good. My said
Trustee is not to be accountable to anyone for the
manner in which he disposes the funds or the recipients
thereof and I give him sole and absolute discretion in the
disbursement hereof.350
Notwithstanding this broad language, the court upheld the validity of
the trust, observing that the trustee had administered it according to the
351testator's wishes for more than three years.
On the other hand, the use of an honorary trust for a non-charitable
benevolent purpose was rejected by a Connecticut court in Fidelity Title
& Trust Co. v. Clyde.3 5 2 The problem was not that the testator's purpose
could not be ascertained with certainty; rather, the court deemed his ex-
pressed purpose to be contrary to public policy. 353 The case involved the
will of Theodore Schroeder, a retired member of the New York bar and
the author of a legal textbook on "Obscene Literature and Constitutional
Law."354 After retiring from the practice of law, he published numerous
articles on psychology.355 After working with publishers Ethel Clyde and
Leslie Kuhn in 1951, Schroeder published a compilation of articles criti-
cizing religious beliefs, and at the time of his death, he was preparing to
publish another compilation of articles directed mainly against he Mor-
mon Church.356 In his will, Schroeder bequeathed his residuary estate to
Clyde and Kuhn "to be expended in the collection and arrangement and
See id at 662.
350 Id. at 660.
See id at 661.
352 121 A.2d 625 (Conn. 1956).
See id at 630; see also Alexander v. House, 54 A.2d 510, 512 (Conn. 1947).
354 See Fidelity Title & Tr. Co., 143 Conn. at 626-27.
See id at 627.
356 See id
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publications of my writing." 35 7 This bequest presumably referred to the
aforementioned material that he was planning to publish at the time of
his death.358
Two of Schroeder's first cousins successfully challenged the validity
of the proposed trust and defendants Clyde and Kuhn appealed.359 They
contended that the bequest was an absolute gift and not subject to any
sort of trust.3 6 0 However, the court responded that a trust was intended
notwithstanding the fact that the testator did not use the words "trust" or
"trustee."36 1 The defendants then argued that the trust was charitable in
nature and was, therefore, valid even though no beneficiaries were
identified in the will. 3 62 The court conceded that "a trust to promote the
dissemination of knowledge or beliefs through the distribution of books
or pamphlets may, in the absence of any profit element, qualify as a valid
charity."3 63 However, the court took a dim view of the subject matter of
Schroeder's proposed book, describing it as a "truly nauseating experi-
ence in the field of pornography."3 64 Consequently, it concluded that the
proposed trust was invalid as a charitable trust because it was contrary to
public policy.365
Finally, Clyde and Kuhn claimed that the bequest, if it failed to
qualify as a charitable trust, should be treated as an honorary trust.366
However, the court refused to consider whether the bequest would quali-
fy as an honorary trust since it had already concluded that its purpose
was contrary to public policy. 36 7 As the court observed, "[t]he illegality
permeates the gift no matter what form it takes. Gifts devoted to illegal
objectives are void." 3 68
357 Id. at 628.
358 See id
359 See id at 627.
360 See id at 628.
361 See id at 628-29.
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V. MODERN NON-CHARITABLE PURPOSE TRUSTS
Modem non-charitable purpose trusts differ from traditional honor-
ary trusts in a number of respects; for example, an honorary trust will fail
if the designated trustee refuses to serve or fails to carry out the trust.36 9
In contrast, where a modem non-charitable purpose trust is concerned, a
court may save the trust by appointing another trustee if this failure
occurs.37 0 In addition, the traditional honorary trust was limited to
twenty-one years in order to comply with the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties.371 However, a modem purpose trust for the care of an animal may
last more than twenty-one years notwithstanding the Rule Against
Perpetuities.37 2
A. The Uniform Trust Code
Like the Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform Trust Code recognizes
purpose trusts, but distinguishes between trusts for the care of animals
and other non-charitable purpose trusts.373 Section 408(a) authorizes the
creation of a trust for the care of an animal by declaring that:
[a] trust may be created to provide for the care of an
animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust termi-
nates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was
created to provide for the care of more than one animal
alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the
last surviving animal.374
In addition, section 408(b) allows the settlor or a court to appoint
someone to enforce the trust on the animal's behalf:
A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by a
person appointed in the terms of the trust or, if no person
is so appointed, by a person appointed by the court. A
person having an interest in the welfare of the animal
369 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1935).
370 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408 cmt. (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 490-91 (2000).
371 See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS,
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 441 (4th ed. 2010).
372 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408 cmt., 7C U.L.A. 494.
See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 408, 409, 7C U.L.A. 490-95.
374 Id. § 408(a).
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may request the court to appoint a person to enforce the
trust or to remove a person appointed.375
Finally, section 408(c) states that:
[p]roperty of a trust authorized by this section may
be applied only to its intended use, except to the extent
the court determines that the value of the trust property
exceeds the amount required for the intended use. Except
as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, property
not required for the intended use must be distributed to
the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the settlor's suc-
cessors in interest.376
Section 408 of the Uniform Trust Code addresses a number of issues
associated with trusts of this nature. First, it avoids problems with the
Rule Against Perpetuities by expressly allowing the trust to last for the
duration of the animal's life. 3 77 Second, it solves the enforcement
problem by allowing the settlor or the court to appoint a trust protector to
ensure that the trustee carries out settlor's intent.378 Finally, the Code
provides a procedure by which trust property that is not necessary for the
care of the animal may be returned to the settlor or to the settlor's
successors in interest.37 9
Section 409 of the Uniform Trust Code is concerned with non-
charitable trusts without ascertainable beneficiaries other than trusts for
the care of animals.380 It also recognizes the validity of trusts for a non-
charitable, but valid purpose to be selected by the trustee.38 1 Section
409(a), which resembles the Uniform Probate Code's section 2-907(a),
provides that: "[a] trust may be created for a non-charitable purpose
without a definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary or for a non-
charitable but otherwise valid purpose to be selected by the trustee. The
11382trust may not be enforced for more than [21] years.
375 Id. § 408(b).
376 Id. § 408(c).
See id § 408(a).
378 See id § 408(b).
See id § 408(c).
380 See id § 409.
381 See Tritt, supra note 20, at 753.
382 Id. § 409(1).
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Section 409(2) states that: "[t]he trust authorized by this section may
be enforced by a person appointed in the terms of the trust or, if no
person is so appointed, by a person appointed by the court."383
Section 409(3) declares that:
[p]roperty of a trust authorized by this section may
be applied only to its intended use, except to the extent
the court determines that the value of the trust property
exceeds the amount required for the intended use. Except
as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, property
not required for the intended use must be distributed to
the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the settlor's suc-
cessors in interest.3 84
Section 409 resembles section 408 in many respects. Like section
408, it deals with the enforcement problem by allowing the settlor or the
court to appoint a trust protector to see that the trustee carries out
385settlor's intent. In addition, it provides a procedure by which trust pro-
perty that is not necessary to carry out the trust purpose is returned to the
settlor or to the settlor's successors in interest.38 6 However, unlike trusts
for the care of an animal, purpose trusts authorized by section 409 are
387limited in duration to a period of twenty-one years.
B. Drafting Trust Instruments and Advising Clients
Drafting a non-charitable purpose trust raises a number of potential
questions. First, what is the settlor's specific objective or purpose?
Second, how much property should be placed in the trust in order to
achieve these objectives? Third, what should be the duration of the trust?
Fourth, how will the trust be enforced in the absence of human bene-
ficiaries? Fifth, how can the trust be modified or terminated? Sixth,
should the arrangement be described as a trust or as a power of appoint-
ment?
383 Id. § 409(2).
384 Id. § 409(3).
385 See id § 409(2).
386 See id § 409(3).
387 See id § 409(1).
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1. Identification of Trust Purposes
Although the various Restatements indicate that honorary trusts may
be created to carry out a variety of purposes, they only list some of the
more common ones such as the maintenance of graves and monuments,
saying of masses and the care of animals.388 In contrast, section 409(1) of
the Uniform Trust Code provides that a trust may be created for any "non-
charitable purpose."38 9 This suggests that purpose trusts authorized by the
Code may be used to carry out a much broader range of purposes than
those allowed under traditional honorary trusts. As Alexander Bove has
suggested, these trusts may be used to effectuate a number of business and
domestic purposes that do not qualify as charitable.390 For example, the
owner of a family business could create a trust in order to engage in off
balance sheet transactions with the firm.39' On the domestic side, a settlor
might want to create a trust to hold property for his family for generations
without risking disputes, control issues, or interference by creditors.392
The drafter's principal responsibility is to identify and articulate the
settlor's intentions clearly, while at the same time, leaving room for the
trustee to exercise discretion and respond to changing conditions. Obvi-
ously, it is essential for the drafter to have a serious discussion with the
settlor to ascertain what his or her general intentions are as a first step
toward reducing them to writing. If a trustee has already been chosen, it
might be advisable to include the trustee in this discussion as well. Also,
if the trust is testamentary, the drafter should avoid referring in the will
to any oral directions that the settlor might have given the trustee about
the trust's objectives.393 Otherwise, a court might invalidate the trust as a
"semi-secret" trust for failure to comply with the statutory requirements
for the execution of wills. 394
The drafter should also remember that courts may refuse to approve
private trusts that they deem to be "capricious" in nature.395 In theory,
this ability enables courts to invalidate dispositions of property that are
388 See id § 409(1).
389 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1935).
390 See Bove, supra note 1, at 37.
391 See id
392 See id
See Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221 (1881).
394 See id; see also Pickelner v. Adler, 229 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409 cmt. (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 493-94 (2000);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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wasteful or have little social benefit. Unfortunately, the line between
acceptable and capricious purposes is not always so clear. Indeed,
according to the Restatement of Trusts, "[a] clear line cannot be drawn
for purposes of this rule between objectives that are capricious-or
'frivolous' or 'whimsical'-and those that are not."396 However, a survey
of the case law suggests that in the past most purposes considered to be
capricious were truly outrageous. These included publishing worthless
writings,39 7 exhibiting worthless objects of art,398 keeping a clock in good
- 39- 400 -**repair, 99 keeping a portrait in good repair, or hiring a military band to
play at the settlor's grave.4 01 However, some of these purposes may be
more acceptable in today's cultural environment. For example, a modem
court is much less likely to characterize writings or artwork as "worth-
less." In addition, some of these cases may not be directly on point
because the issue was not the intrinsic merit of the trust's purpose, but
whether the trust was charitable and, therefore, not subject to the Rule
Against PerpetuitieS.402 Nevertheless, drafters should be cautious about
creating trusts to achieve socially dubious objectives.
Keeping in mind the certainty principle, the drafter should avoid
setting forth objectives in the trust that are impracticable or impossible to
carry out. In addition, the drafter should not only clearly identify the
objectives of the trust, but he or she should provide some instructions on
how to carry out these objectives. For example, if the purpose of the trust
is to care for an animal, the trust instrument should specify whether the
trustee or some other person will have physical custody of the animal and
perhaps provide some guidance about the nature of this care. However,
in many cases, instructions about how to achieve the trust's objectives or
how the trust is to be administered should leave the trustee with some
396 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2000). However,
comment e does declare that "it is capricious to provide that money shall be thrown into
the sea, that a field shall be sowed with salt, that a house shall be boarded up and remain
unoccupied, or that a wasteful undertaking or activity shall be continued." Id.; see also id.
§ 29 cmt. m.
See Fidelity Title & Tr. Co. v. Clyde, 121 A.2d 625 (Conn. 1956); Wilber v.
Asbury Park Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 59 A.2d 570 (N.J. Ch. Ct. 1948), aff'd sub nom.,
Wilber v. Owens, 65 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1949).
398 See Med. Soc'y of South Carolina v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 14 S.E.2d 577
(S.C. 1941).
See Kelly v. Nichols, 21 A. 906, 909 (R.I. 1891).
400 See In re Gassiot, [1901] 70 LJ Ch 242 (Eng.).
401 See Detwillerv. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq. 347, 350 (1883).
402 See id at 353-55.
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discretion, particularly if unforeseen conditions or circumstances occur.
The drafter should also identify those functions that can be delegated by
the trustee to others.
Finally, the Uniform Trust Code allows settlors to delegate the selec-
tion of trust beneficiaries to trustees.4 03 In effect, this gives the trustee a
discretionary power of appointment. Although this delegation may be
legal, it may not be very wise. Language such as "I give my Trustee
absolute authority to dispose of this my entire estate as he may see fit"
provides absolutely no guidance to either the trustee or to a court about
the nature of the testator's intent. It would be better to allow the trustee
to select from a narrow category of charitable institutions instead of
giving the trustee unfettered discretion. For example, the trust could
authorize the trustee to distribute funds from the trust to "such
institutions as he may select who engage in the care and support of
homeless dogs and cats." Even better, the settlor could allow the trustee
to choose from among a named group of charities in the same manner
that a spray or sprinkle trust functions with human beneficiaries.404
2. Choosing a Trustee
A second issue is the choice of a trustee. If the trust is an inter vivos
trust, the settlor may prefer to act as trustee, at least for a while. How-
ever, if the trust is testamentary, the settlor must choose a third-party
trustee. Depending on the circumstances, the trustee may be a family
member, a trusted friend, a hired professional or a corporate fiduciary.405
If the trust is small and of short duration, as for example, a trust for the
care of an elderly pet, it may be preferable to appoint a family member or
friend as trustee. In such cases, the trust instrument may also relieve the
trustee of the duty to account or to segregate or earmark trust property.
However, if the trust is large, complicated, or of longer duration, the
trustee may be required to invest assets, keep accurate records, file tax
returns and perform other fiduciary duties.406 In such cases, it would be
403 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(c) (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 481-83 (2000).
404 A spray trust is a trust that gives the trustee discretion to distribute part or all of
the trust income, principal, or both, among a group of beneficiaries, identified by name or
class. See Eileen B. Trost, The Truth About Trusts, 32 FAM. ADvoc. 26, 28 (Spring
2010). A sprinkle trust is one in which the trustee has discretion to distribute income,
principal, or both to a single beneficiary, as needed. See id.
405 See J.E. Harker, Choosing a Trustee: The Case for the Corporate Fiduciary, 8
PROB. & PROP. 44 (May/June 1994).
406 See id at 45.
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better to choose someone with professional expertise, such as a lawyer,
accountant or financial advisor.407 Another possibility would be to
choose a bank or other corporate fiduciary.40s Not only would this
approach avoid the need to appoint successor trustees, but corporate
fiduciaries can typically provide a full range of administrative and
409
managerial services.
3. Funding the Trust
The size of the trust corpus will ultimately depend on the client's
wealth and the amount he or she wishes to devote to carrying out the
objectives of the trust. Obviously, it is necessary to provide enough funds
to enable the trust to function as intended.41 o In addition, the client should
be encouraged to err on the side of generosity if the trust is intended to
remain in existence for a long period of time since inflation and un-
foreseen expenses can undermine the economic viability of a long-term
trust.4 1' On the other hand, settlors should not fund their trusts with more
funds than are necessary to carry out their intended purposes. A recent
example of this sort of extravagance was the testamentary trust that
Leona Helmsley established for her Maltese dog, Trouble.4 12 Disin-
heriting a number of family members, Helmsley bequeathed $12 million
to a pet trust to ensure that Trouble lived a life of luxury.413 As expected,
family members challenged the bequest and a surrogate judge reduced
the trust corpus to a mere $2 million.414 Judge ordered reductions like




410 See Renga v. Spadone, 159 A.2d 142, 144 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1960) (finding that
$10,000 bequest was insufficient to construct mausoleum according to testator's speci-
fications).
411 Consider the relatively modest sums that nineteenth and early twentieth century
settlors allocated to the care and maintenance of gravesites and cemetery plots. See In re
Braig's Estate, 36 Pa. D. &. C.2d 469, 471-72 (Orphans' Ct. 1965) ($72 per year).
412 See Ashley Glassman, Comment, Making Pet Trusts Instruments of Settlors and
not of Courts, 89 OR. L. REV. 385, 385 (2010).
413 See id at 385.
414 See id
415 See In re Stewart's Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 488, 489-90 (C. P. 1979); In re
Lyon's Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 474, 483-84 (C. P. 1974) The Uniform Trust Code
authorizes courts to distribute such excess funds to remainder beneficiaries, if there are
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cautioned, particularly where pet trusts are concerned, against "over-
funding" since its remainder beneficiaries, such as family members or
charities, can subject the trust to significant legal expenses if they bring
suit to modify the terms of the trust.
4. Duration
To avoid violating the Rule Against Perpetuities, courts rarely
allowed honorary trusts to last more than twenty-one years.416 The most
common way to satisfy the Rule's requirements was to rule that such
trusts authorized the "trustee" to carry out the trust purpose through the
exercise of successive annual powers for a period of no more than
twenty-one years.417 Although this approach was generally adequate to
sustain trusts for the care of domestic animals, it was not very well suited
for trusts of longer duration, such as those for the maintenance and care
of graves or monuments.
The Uniform Trust Code distinguishes between trusts for the care of
animals and trusts for other purposes. Section 409 of the Code permits
trusts for the care of animals to last for the life of the animal even if it
exceeds the traditional twenty-one year limit.41 s This is a sensible
approach since most domestic animals will not live for many years
beyond that limit. However, for other purpose trusts, section 408 estab-
lishes a durational limit of twenty-one years.419 Unless the jurisdiction
has abolished or modified the Rule Against Perpetuities,42 0 the drafter
will have to limit the duration of such a trust to a period of twenty-one
years, even though a longer period would be more appropriate.
5. Enforcement
Unlike a conventional private trust, in the case of a non-charitable
purpose trust, there are no beneficiaries to ensure that the trustee admini-
sters the trust properly. The Restatement of Trusts solved this problem by
any, or to the settlor's estate or intestate heirs by way of a resulting trust. See UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 409 (3) (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 494 (2000).
416 See also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 355
(2013).
417 See In re Estate of Kelly [1932] 1 IR 255 (H. Ct.); In re Searight's Estate, 95
N.E.2d 779,783 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
418 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 494 (2006).
419 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408, 7C U.L.A. 490-93.
420 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 56 (discussing modification and abolition of
the Rule).
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providing that an honorary trust would terminate at the request of the
settlor's heirs or remainder beneficiaries if the trustee failed to carry out
the trust's provisions.4 21 Of course, this approach completely frustrated
the settlor's intent since it terminated the trust instead of enforcing it.
In contrast, the Uniform Trust Code provides that a non-charitable
purpose trust "may be enforced by a person appointed in the terms of the
trust or, if no person is so appointed, by a person appointed by the
court."4 22 This is a much better approach than that associated with honor-
ary trusts. It follows that the drafter should provide for the appointment
of an "enforcer" or trust protector.423 Ideally, the settlor should choose a
family member or friend to serve as trust protector, although choosing a
424trust protector may also be delegated to the trustee or a third party. In
recent years, trust protectors have become an integral part of trust
administration.4 25 They not only oversee the actions of the trustee, but
they can also perform a number of administrative functions that have
traditionally been performed by trustees.426 Thus, a trust protector would
seem to be an ideal solution to the enforceability problem.
6 Modification and Termination
Furthermore, the drafter should provide a mechanism in the trust
instrument for modification or termination if it becomes impractical to
carry out the trust purpose as originally contemplated by the settlor.
Courts can invoke the doctrine of cy pres to modify a charitable trust
when circumstances unanticipated by the settlor make it impossible or
impractical to carry out the original purpose of the trust.4 27 Although cy
pres is not available to modify non-charitable trusts, in some cases courts
have relied on the doctrine of equitable deviation to modify the admini-
421 See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1935).
422 UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 408 (b), 409 (2), 7C U.L.A. 490, 494.
423 See Lawrence A. Frolik, Trust Protectors: Why They Have Become "The Next
Big Thing," 50 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 267, 268 (2015).
424 See id.
425 See id. However, Alexander Bove points out that for a hundred years or more,
settlors employed "trust advisors" to perform many of the functions that are now assigned
to trust protectors. See Bove, supra note 23.
426 See Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Trust Protectors in American Trust Law, 45
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 319, 329-33 (2010).
427 "Cy pres," which means "as near as" in French, allows the court to appoint an
alternative beneficiary as near as may be to the original beneficiary if the settlor has
expressed a more general charitable intent. See In the Matter of the Mary R. Latimer
Trust, 78 A.3d 875, 879 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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strative provisions of an irrevocable trust when unforeseen circumstances
occur that threaten to defeat or impair the accomplishment of the pur-
poses of the trust.428 However, because seeking judicial modification of a
trust can be expensive, it is better to vest this power in the trustee or,
better yet, in a trust protector.
429
7. Federal Taxation Issues
Finally, the drafter should consider the possible tax consequences for
the grantor, the trust, and the recipients of trust funds. Depending on size,
duration and distribution scheme of the trust, there could be potential
liability for income tax, estate tax, gift tax, or even generation-skipping
transfer tax.430
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
The Uniform Trust Code expressly allows a trust to be created to
carry out any specified non-charitable purpose as long as it is not illegal
or capricious.431 This potentially expands the scope of purpose trusts
beyond the objectives that were associated with honorary trusts in the
past. The Uniform Trust Code also authorizes trusts where the trustee is
given the discretion to apply trust funds to unspecified non-charitable
purposes.4 32 Finally, the Code authorizes states to allow such trusts to
exist for twenty-one years in some cases.4 33 While there is much to like
about the Code's approach, it could be improved in some respects to
better carry out testators' intent.
First, the Code should make it clear that a purpose trust may be
created to carry out any purpose or objective that is not obviously illegal,
wasteful, or contrary to public policy.4 34 These would not only include
traditional objectives such as the maintenance of tombs and gravesites,
performance of religious services, and care of animals, but would also
428
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2013), 7C U.L.A. 5 (2006); see also Ausness,
Sherlock Holmes, supra note 32.
429 See Ausness, Sherlock Holmes, supra note 32, at 292-94.
430 For a discussion of some of these tax issues, see Alexander A. Bove, Jr., Rise of
the Purpose Trust, TR. & EST. 18, 22-25 (Aug. 2005).
431 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409(1), 7C U.L.A. 484-85.
432 See id.
See id. However, section 408(a) permits a trust for the care of an animal to last
for the life of the animal.
This also suggests that the concept of "capriciousness" should be removed from
the Code and its comments.
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include a variety of other worthwhile activities such as promotion of arts
and crafts, advancement of education and religion, encouragement of
sports, support of celebrations, recreation and civic events, preservation
of historic and family buildings and property, and the advocacy of
political, social, and environmental initiatives.
Second, the power of courts to reduce the amount allocated to the
achievement of specified trust objectives should be greatly restricted,
particularly when the trust is of relatively short duration. One possibility
would be to allow settlors to prohibit courts from exercising this power
for a period of ten years after the settlor's death. Although such a
provision would adversely affect the interests of other beneficiaries, its
effect would be no different than a provision that postponed the enjoy-
ment of a bequest until the beneficiary reached a certain age.
Third, the durational imit for non-charitable purpose trusts should be
raised or eliminated. Arguably trusts for other purposes should last until
the purpose is fully achieved. There is no reason why trusts which have
long-term objectives, such as the maintenance of gravesites, parks or
buildings, should be terminated at the end of twenty-one years. If the
settlor's purpose is a legitimate one, the trust should last as long as
necessary. At the very least, the Code's twenty-one year durational limit
in such cases should be increased to something like one hundred years.
Finally, the Code should make it clear that non-charitable purpose
trusts are trusts, not powers of appointment. Inspired by a theory pro-
posed by the losing party in Holland v. Alcock, 4 35 James Barr Ames
argued that honorary trusts should not be regarded as trusts, but should
instead by conceptualized as non-fiduciary powers of appointment which
the donee could choose to exercise or not.436 Professor Scott incorporated
the Ames approach into the First43 7 and Second Restatement of Trusts,438
although the Third Restatement appears to have finally shifted to a trust
approach .439
At least where a trustee is charged with carrying out a specific ob-
jective, like the care of an animal or the maintenance of a gravesite, the
arrangement seems more like a traditional trust than a power of appoint-
ment. Unlike the holders of personal powers, trustees hold an office and
108 N.Y. 312 (1888).
436 See Ames, supra note 67, at 389.
437 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1935).
438 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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can be replaced with successors if they die or become incapacitated.
Furthermore, there is a fully-developed body of law associated with the
fiduciary duties of a trustee. In contrast, the holders of personal powers
owe no fiduciary duties and can do as they please as long as they do not
violate the express terms of the trust.440 The only situation where a
"trustee" should be treated as the holder of a personal power is when the
settlor provides funds for a non-charitable, but valid purpose to be
selected by the trustee.
VII. CONCLUSION
Sections 408 and 409 of the Uniform Trust Code recognize that a
trust may be validly created to carry out any valid non-charitable
purpose.44' In so doing, the Code expands the scope of purpose trusts
beyond the objectives that were associated with non-charitable purpose
trusts in the past. The Code also authorizes trusts where the trustee is
vested with the discretion to apply trust funds to unspecified non-
charitable purposes.442 Finally, the Code authorizes states to allow such
trusts to exist for more than twenty-one years in some cases.443
These improvements should be applauded. They greatly expand the
scope of private trusts in a way that enables estate planners to implement
their clients' wishes. However, further reforms are possible. First, the
Code should make it clear that a purpose trust may be created to carry
out any purpose or objective that is not obviously illegal, wasteful or
contrary to public policy. Second, settlors should be able to prevent
courts from reducing the amount allocated to the achievement of
specified trust objectives, particularly when the trust is of relatively short
duration. Third, the durational limit for non-charitable purpose trusts
should be raised or eliminated. Finally, the Code should make it clear
that non-charitable purpose trusts are trusts, not powers of appointment.
440 See Bove, supra note 430.
441 See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 408, 409 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 490-95 (2000).
442 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409(1).
44 3 See id. § 409.1.
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